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Hitler at War: What *Really* Happened?

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Part 3

Chapter 2: The Roots of Defeat

"Never in our history have we been defeated by the strength of our foes, but always by our own vices and by the enemies in our own camp."

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, volume 2, chapter XV

The Army was to the German people what the U.S. Constitution is for Americans, or the monarchy to the English. Every people requires something in their culture which most deeply signifies their particular identity. With names such as Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck as their heritage, it is no wonder that the Germans regarded their armed forces as the institution which best epitomized their country. But with Bismarck's dismissal, the German General Staff, using the impotent royal house as a constitutional front, became the real power in the land. From the late 19th Century until the end of World War I, the country was ruled by

the army's class-conscious aristocrats behind the facade of an obedient monarchy, however symbolic. With the humiliation of November, 1918, however, they were forced out of government by Social Democrats and other Marxists. Throughout the 1920's, the generals slowly began to regain some of their former influence as the visible symbols and military power of conservative capitalists. Germany was being torn between the selfish forces of Left and Right.

When Adolf Hitler's ideological movement of class cooperation arose, it was bitterly opposed by these reactionaries, whose world did not extend beyond the circumscribed borders of blue-blooded elitism. Their goal was the restoration of the monarchy, behind whose bemedalled, intellectually hollow figure-heads, like General Hugo von Hindenburg, the country's aristocrats could rule in thinly veiled majesty. Ostensibly patriotic, their concept of "Germany" was limited to Prussia and their own upper classes. Middle Class people were looked down upon as vulgar tradesmen, while the so-called "Proletariat" was nothing more than another word for peasantry. Moreover, the other German states were relegated to secondary importance, to be dominated, if not led, by the superior aristocrats.

It was this type of insufferable snobbery that naturally contributed to the decline in morale among German soldiers from Bavaria, Pomerania and all the other states, who were expected to suffer and die during the First World War no less nobly than their Prussian counterparts. Such class and regional divisions were successfully played upon by Allied propaganda throughout that conflict. These were the same class-conscious conservatives who subjected National Socialism to its first blood-bath, when sixteen unarmed comrades were shot by Reichswehr soldiers under orders from their upper-class officers in Munich, on 9 November 1923.

When Adolf Hitler was elected to form a new government ten years later, his greatest challenge was to preserve the army as Germany's emblematic institution, while fending off the hostility of its hateful aristocrats bent on either using him as a puppet, as they had von Hindenburg, or replacing him altogether with some compliant Prussian monarch. The Fuehrer and his closest colleagues anticipated this problem long before their 1933 Seizure of Power, but were divided over its solution. Hitler believed that the old army brass should be generously pensioned off as soon as possible, allowing them to serve out their active careers, their ranks steadily replaced by National Socialists.

Although such a process took time, it was legal and stood less chance of arousing general staff opposition. Others were afraid that the army officers could not help but understand the consequences to their aristocratic ambitions gradual retirement presented, and urged their immediate replacement by ideologically sound Party members. Everyone recognized that the general staff was a nest of hostility to National Socialism, and therefore a great, internal danger, particularly if the

Third Reich ever found itself in a war. Stalin had purged his unreliable, former Czarist army officers, and put politically dependable men in their place. Hitler should do the same. So reasoned men like Ernst Roehm, Chief of Staff of the Stormtroops (the S.A., or *Sturmabeilungen*).

In late June, 1934, Roehm wanted to forcibly supplant conservative army officers with his own Stormtroopers. He knew of Hitler's opposition to the move, and therefore planned to murder him, as well. Learning of his S.A. leader's intentions, the Fuehrer personally arrested Roehm before any confrontations with the military could take place. Some 300 conspirators were summarily executed, including non-SA personnel, even a few SS men, giving lie to conventional historians who insist Hitler persecuted his own loyal Brown Shirts to curry favor with the Army brass and replace the S.A. with the "more reliable" S.S. In truth, he acted only out of self-defense. Suppression of the attempt did indeed assuage general staff fears that Hitler might use violence to take over the army, but it also hindered his plans to make it National Socialist.

Now the aristocrats dug in, stubbornly resisting all efforts to fill the armed forces with ideologically trustworthy men. When war came just five years later, the Wehrmacht was still controlled by genteel snobs diametrically opposed to National Socialism and anxious for any opportunity to destroy it, even by betraying their own country. The head of the Reich's own military intelligence, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (of whom much will be said later), spoke for his fellow traitors, when he said, "Germany's victory would be a greater catastrophe than her defeat."

In other words, Canaris and his upper-class ilk preferred the incineration of millions of German women and children, the primary victims of Allied terror-bombing, to Hitler's success. Such profound treason can only be understood in the context of the aristocratic mentality. It was physically revolted by National Socialism's class-collaboration, wherein common German workers rubbed shoulders with well-born gentry as equally valuable members of society. They were simply mortified that their commander-in-chief was a mere Austrian and vulgar tradesman of the lower classes, which had foolishly elected him to office. But aristocratic disdain for him turned to murderous rage, when this former lance corporal consistently won victory in the field, almost always against their professional (albeit obsolete) strategies. The most effective way to make a stupid man angry is not to tell him that he is stupid, but to demonstrate to him that he is stupid. This Hitler did to the conservative generals repeatedly, thereby earning their remorseless enmity.

Many years after Roehm's well-intentioned but misguided attempt to forcibly remove the aristocrats from the Army---when far more world-shaking events made almost everyone else forget the dead S.A. Chief of Staff---Dr. Joseph Goebbels,

perhaps alone of other leaders, clearly understood the terrible consequences that had been set in motion just eleven years earlier. On 27 March 27 1945, with his country in flaming ruins, he realized that the old General Staff aristocrats had cost Germany the war: "I point out to the Fuehrer at length that in 1934 we unfortunately failed to reform the Wehrmacht when we had an opportunity to do so. What Roehm wanted was, of course, right in itself. Had Roehm been an upright, solid personality, in all probability some hundred generals rather than some hundred S.A. leaders would have been shot on 30 June. The whole course of events was profoundly tragic, and today we are feeling its effects. In that year, the time was ripe to revolutionize the Reichswehr. As things were, the Fuehrer was unable to seize the opportunity."

Since Hitler's frontline experience in the trenches, he had always admired the General Staff as the epitome of everything traditionally valuable in his country, the solid pillar of German nationhood. But gradual disillusionment with its class-conscious martinets was a bitter disappointment. Well into the war, he still regarded them with respect. Too late, he came to regret his formerly deep regard for most of the army brass. "For years," he told Hans Frank, the Governor-General of conquered Poland late in the war, "these gentlemen with their fancy, red-striped breeches have betrayed, forgotten, or sold out the principles of Moltke and Schlieffen. This presumptuous Junker caste is, in reality, nothing more than a collection of muddle-heads, vacillators, and stuffed shirts" (Innes, 18). Events would soon show them to be traitors besides.

An uneasy accord between Party and Army prevailed throughout the early 1930s. By 1935, however, in the face of growing threats from abroad, Hitler's plans for rearmament were strenuously opposed by the general staff. During the Ruhr, Czech and Austrian crises, its officers had shown a singular lack of courage or resolve, and Hitler knew they would fold in the face of a real international confrontation. Accordingly, on 4 February 1938, he assumed the office of Commander -in-Chief of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (the OKW), the Armed Forces High Command. Many high-ranking officers were outraged at the mere prospect of having to take orders from a former Austrian corporal. The next year, their opposition went underground in the so-called "Generals' Plot" to take over the legal government. But the cowardice of its plotters doomed it to failure. With the opening of World War Two in September, 1939, the army brass initially and urgently resisted any campaign in Poland as "un-winnable". After having been reluctantly dragged into the field by the momentum of history, their shop-worn, 1914-vintage strategies almost lost the war in its fortnight. General staff resistance to almost every subsequent campaign and even many battles continuously sabotaged the common soldier's effort to win, until the war was eventually lost.

Referring to Germany's defeat in World War One, Hitler had written as early as *Mein Kampf* that military disaster was always the consequence of some internal, rather than external weakness. This observation applied as much to his own Reich, with its conservative Wehrmacht, as to the conflict he knew first-hand as a young soldier. When war came in 1939, three-quarters of the men still holding posts in the Third Reich government and military had been appointed during the Weimar Republic. Few were National Socialists. Some others were more or less favorably disposed toward Hitler, but the majority were aristocratic opportunists who followed orders only if they were in accordance with the welfare and maintenance of their class.

Much later in the war, with Europe fighting for its life during the dark days of 1944, the Fuehrer was appalled to learn that of his 8,000,000 soldiers, only 260,000 had been sent to the front. No wonder they were so horribly outnumbered everywhere! In May of that same year, Soviet forces unexpectedly breached the Germans' southern line, forcing a rapid retreat to Sevastopol, which fell soon after, because the General Staff had failed to supply enough weapons and ammunition stored in abundance at nearby depots.

Perhaps the single most decisive instance of aristocratic treason occurred in summer, 1941. Hitler's assault against Russia up until then had been a total success, much to the surprise and professional jealousy of the army generals, who had opposed it almost to a man. Now they wanted to assume complete direction (and credit) for a campaign that already seemed as good as won. From its beginning, the Fuehrer had insisted that victory must be swift, with the enemy defeated before winter, because Germany simply did not have the resources necessary for a prolonged conflict. And Russia was infamous for its disastrous weather that could grind any army to a halt. To achieve success in time, destroying or capturing the Soviets' supplies of oil, iron and manganese was the chief strategic objective. His generals demurred. They insisted instead that the USSR's industrial centers should be attacked. Hitler countered by pointing out that if the English had been able to remove their factories beyond the Luftwaffe's reach, so could the Russians. Besides, war plants can be rebuilt or relocated. The loss of petroleum and minerals, without which they cannot operate, is more serious. The loss of even many factories is nothing compared to the loss of natural resources. Hence, conquest of the Ukraine, the major source of Soviet supply, was paramount. Hitler's strategy prevailed, and so did German arms, until he was badly stricken with abdominal cramps in late August.

For nearly three weeks, he was incommunicado. When he sufficiently recovered to assume again his command of the Eastern Front, he was alarmed to learn that the generals had taken advantage of his illness to divert the Army toward Moscow,

with its heavy industry and the prospect of glory for any general who might capture it. Wehrmacht troops just reached the suburbs of the Russian capital, when one of the worst winter storms in recorded history paralyzed their advance in its tracks. Just then, the Soviets counter-attacked, not only repelling the Germans, but throwing them into head-long retreat. Worse, Hitler was now faced with waging a prolonged war for which he lacked sufficient natural resources, while the enemy's supplies were still intact. Had his strategy been maintained, the USSR would have been forced to surrender. Instead, thanks to the General Staff, the war had reached a desperate turning-point the Fuehrer would be hard-pressed to restore in Germany's favor.

Most of the aristocrat traitors survived the defeat they brought about to publish their own versions of events, uniformly portraying Hitler as a mad amateur who lost the war, because he refused to listen to their superior advice. Most of these men escaped the kangaroo-court "justice" of the post-war Nuremberg Trials to live out their lives in the same kind of comfortable ease to which their class had always been accustomed. And it is largely because of their lies about the war published to cover their own ineptitude and betrayal that the outside world is still deceived about the real conduct of that conflict.

More than any other factor of the Second World War, treason committed by the German General Staff was responsible for its outcome.







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